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"Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking
a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess those
reasons."
I
In Batson v. Kentucky,2 the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's
purposefully discriminatory use of. peremptory challenges3 against
venirepersons of the same race as the defendant violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Batson eased the difficult bur-
den of proof that the Court had imposed on defendants in Swain v. Ala-
bama.' Swain required a defendant challenging the prosecution's practices
to prove repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases. In Batson the
1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. After the group of prospective jurors has been assembled, each side is allowed an unlimited
number of "challenges for cause," which are made on a "narrowly specified, provable, and legally
cognizable basis of partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). In addition, each side is
allowed a specified number of peremptory challenges. These are made "without a reason stated, with-
out inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Id.; see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 139-75 (1977). Pe-
remptory challenges are not a constitutional right. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
4. The Court based its decision in Batson on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than on the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. Prior to Batson,
two federal circuits had utilized the Sixth Amendment as the basis for prohibiting a prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to sidestep the almost impossible burden that Swain v.
Alabama imposed on a defendant. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S.
1001, affd on reconsideration, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987);
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). Prior to Batson,
five state courts used state constitutional equivalents to the Sixth Amendment to reach the same result.
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d
997 (Del. 1985); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,
387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct.
App. 1980). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case raising the question whether the fair
cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the prosecution's racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges, specifically in the context of a white defendant objecting to the removal
of black jurors. Holland v. Illinois, 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 109 S.Ct.
1309 (1989). The Court in the context of "death qualification" for jurors has stated that "an exten-
sion of the fair-cross-section requirement to petit juries would be unworkable and unsound.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 82-87.
5. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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Court stated that this requirement had placed a "crippling burden of
proof"6 on defendants, rendering peremptory challenges "largely immune
from constitutional scrutiny.""
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Bat-
son, the defendant must show: (1) that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group; (2) that peremptory challenges have been used to remove
members of the defendant's race from the jury;8 and (3) that the facts and
other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
peremptories in a racially discriminatory manner.9 In deciding whether a
prima facie case has been raised, the trial judge'0 is to consider such cir-
cumstances as a pattern of strikes against black jurors and a prosecutor's
voir dire questions and statements."
After the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the prosecutor
must explain the peremptory challenges in question. The prosecutor is not
entitled to peremptorily challenge a juror on the assumption that because
of shared race the juror would be partial to the defendant, nor may a
prosecutor simply assert good faith performance of his duties.' 2 Rather,
the prosecutor "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the partic-
ular case to be tried."'"
One of the questions Batson left unanswered' is what procedure courts
6. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
7. Id. at 92-93.
8. Relying on this language, the Third Circuit held that Batson also applies to white defendants
who claim that the prosecutor is purposefully removing white venirepersons from the jury. Virgin
Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1989).
9. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
10. In Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(3) (1982), does not authorize federal magistrates to conduct voir
dire.
11. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
12. Id. at 97-98.
13. Id. at 98.
14. For an analysis of many of the unanswered Batson issues, see Alschuler, The Supreme Court
and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 153, 163-211 (1989). Alschuler identifies seven questions Batson left in its wake: (I) What
constitutes prima facie proof of discriminatory purpose? Compare State v. Vincent, 755 S.W.2d 400,
401-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (prosecutor's use of all peremptories to strike blacks does not spoil jury
that includes substantial number of blacks) with Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 72-75, 542 A.2d 1267,
1278-79 (1988) (prima facie case made when prosecutor used eight of ten challenges against blacks
even though three blacks remained on jury). (2) What qualifies as a racially neutral explanation? See
Alschuler, supra, at 174 ("Whether the presence of one neutral reason is sufficient, whether the
prosecutor must have been wholly uninfluenced by race, or whether the court must probe the prosecu-
tor's psyche deeply enough to determine how he or she would have treated a white juror who exhib-
ited similar characteristics is uncertain."). (3) Should a court remedy improper exclusion by seating
the improperly challenged juror or by dismissing the entire panel? (4) Should representation of a
targeted group on the jury nullify any attempt to raise a prima facie case of discrimination against
that group? This question is related to the first question of what constitutes prima facie proof of
discrimination. (5) Is discrimination on nonracial bases allowed? See State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867,
870 (R.I. 1987) ("Batson does not extend to gender-based discrimination."); Alschuler, supra, at 183
("Were Batson limited to cases of racial discrimination, the limitation would be unattractive. Never-
theless, if Batson were extended to discrimination grounded on 'things like race' as well as race itself,
there might be little left of the peremptory challenge."). (6) Does a defendant have standing to object
to discrimination against prospective jurors of a race other than his own? The Supreme Court will
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should use when inquiring into prosecutorial motives for peremptory chal-
lenges. Once the defense 15 makes out a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination, a court can hear the prosecutor's reasons for the peremp-
tory challenges in question in one of four ways: (1) an ex parte, in camera
hearing in which the prosecutor explains his peremptory challenges out of
the defense's presence and the defense has no opportunity for rebuttal; (2)
an open, non-adversarial hearing in which the defense is present but is
not given an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's reasons; 6 (3) an open,
adversarial hearing allowing the defense to rebut the prosecutor's reasons
and attempt to show them to be pretextual or openly discriminatory; or
(4) a full-scale evidentiary hearing in which the prosecutor is a witness,
testifies to the reasons for his peremptories, and is subjected to cross-
examination by the defense counsel.
The federal circuit courts have split on the question of Batson proce-
dure. Some courts have allowed ex parte, in camera Batson hearings (the
first option above) and thus the exclusion of the defense from listening to
or rebutting the prosecutor's reasons, while other courts have stated that
Batson hearings should be adversarial (the third option above).'" No court
has yet required full-scale evidentiary hearings (the fourth option
above),'" but no court has ruled that they are impermissible, either.
This Note argues, first, that the defense must be present to hear the
prosecutor articulate his "neutral explanation" and, second, that the de-
hear arguments this Term on the question whether either the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury provides a basis for a
white defendant to object to the exclusion of a black juror. Holland v. Illinois, 121 Ill. 2d 126, 520
N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989). (7) Is racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges permissible for defense attorneys? See Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal De-
fendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 808, 809 (1989) (Batson restrictions on prosecutorial peremptory challenges should not be
extended to defendants' use of peremptory challenges). But see Note, Discrimination by the Defense:
Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 CoLUrs. L. REV. 355, 365-68 (1988) (discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges by either side should be disallowed).
The number of issues generated by Batson led one commentator to remark: "If one wanted to
understand how the American trial system for criminal cases came to be the most expensive and time-
consuming in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson." Pizzi,
Batson v. Kentuck, Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 155 (1987).
15. This Note uses the term "defense" to refer to both the defendant and the defense counsel,
except where otherwise noted. Section III will discuss the defendant and defense counsel separately.
See infra text accompanying notes 45-65.
16. Gerstein hearings are an example of this procedure: Judges, in the presence of the defendant,
conduct a non-adversarial hearing to determine probable cause in "information" states that do not
provide preliminary hearings. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
This second option is unlikely to be adopted as a rule for all Batson hearings. Nevertheless, some
courts have allowed such a Batson procedure to occur.
17. Compare United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 338-40 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3154 (1989) and United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1200-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1007-08 (1987) with United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1764 (1989) and United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106-07 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 566 (1988) and United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1257-61 (9th Cir. 1987).
18. But see Powell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 878, 882, 372 S.E.2d 234, 238 (Ct. App. 1988) (Pope,
J., concurring specially) (defense should be allowed to cross-examine prosecutor at Batson hearing).
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fense should have an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's reasons before
the trial judge decides whether to allow the prosecutor's peremptories.
Section I analyzes the Batson opinion and the procedures it requires or
suggests, if any, and argues that Batson left the formulation of procedures
to the lower courts. Section II considers the present split in the federal
circuits and also examines state court decisions. Section III contends that a
defendant's presence at a Batson hearing is a requirement of the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Section also demonstrates that
the general presumption in American criminal procedure is to allow the
defendant to be present at all stages of the criminal prosecution.
Section IV argues that a standard in which the defense has the opportu-
nity for rebuttal after the prosecution has articulated reasons for the per-
emptory challenges in question should be adopted as a floor of protection
against the potential abuse of the jury selection process that still exists in
the wake of Batson. Section V considers the fourth option above-full-
scale evidentiary hearings-and concludes that they should be neither re-
quired nor forbidden. This option should fall completely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.
I. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF Batson
In Batson, the Supreme Court declined "to formulate particular proce-
dures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's
challenges."' 9 The Court made "no attempt to instruct. . . [lower] courts
how best to implement"2 the holding "[i]n light of the variety of jury
selection practices followed in our state and federal trial courts."'"
Despite this apparent refusal to construct a standard procedure, con-
flicting signals emerge from the language of the opinion, leading some
courts to believe that the Court did in fact envision a particular procedure.
One portion of Batson suggests that a Batson hearing should consist of
three steps: (1) the defense makes out a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination; (2) the prosecutor gives reasons for the peremptory chal-
lenges in question; and (3) the trial court rules on the validity of those
peremptories."
At another point, however, the Court hinted that Batson hearings
should be more extensive and follow the lead of Title VII proceedings,
which would permit defense rebuttal of the prosecutor's reasons. In a foot-
note, the Court cited three Title VII cases23 that "explained the operation
19. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
20. Id. at 99-100 n.24.
21. Id. at 99 n.24.
22. "The prosecutor. . . must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried. The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful
discrimination." Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted).
23. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the most im-
portant Title VII case cited, the Court adopted a three-step procedure that would apply in the follow-
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of prima facie burden of proof rules. The party alleging that he has been
the victim of intentional discrimination carries the ultimate burden of
persuasion. '
Some lower courts have read the Court's use of Title VII cases as evi-
dence that a Title VII-type procedure is required in Batson hearings.25
However, the footnote in which the Title VII cases were cited purported
to explain the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. In this way,
the Title VII cases merely illustrate how the burden shifts to the prosecu-
tor after the defendant has made out a prima facie case. It may not have
been intended to specify the particular procedure to be followed, but
rather to identify who carries the ultimate burden of proof."8
Courts that have attempted to "divine" a particular procedural mandate
from Batson have missed the point. In spite of mixed signals in the opin-
ion, the Court deliberately declined to formulate procedures, thus leaving
lower courts room to experiment. This does not mean that courts should
not find that Title VII provides an appropriate example for Batson hear-
ings. However, to come to that conclusion merely by relying on language
in Batson is to misread that decision.
II. CASE LAW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS AND THE STATES
This Section considers the present split in the federal circuits over the
question whether a trial court must allow the defense to be present to hear
and rebut the prosecutor's presentation of reasons for his peremptory
challenges. This Section also considers state court cases that have ad-
dressed this issue.
A. Federal Cases
In the first case to address this question, United States v. Davis," the
Sixth Circuit held that neither the Constitution nor Rule 43(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure2 requires the presence of the de-
fense at a Batson hearing. At trial the prosecution had exercised seven of
its peremptory challenges to remove seven of the nine black venirepersons;
ing way to Batson hearings. First, the defendant has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination; second, the prosecutor has to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for his challenges; finally, the defendant must have an opportunity to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the prosecutor were not true.
24. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18 (citations omitted).
25. See Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 62, 542 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1988); State v. Antwine, 743
S.W.2d 51, 63 (Mo. 1987) (en bane).
26. See United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1201 (6th Cir.) (Batson "has [not] fashioned any
procedural guidelines outside those articulating burdens of proof and persuasion .... "), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1007-08 (1987) .
27. 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007-08 (1987).
28. "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of
the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule." FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
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the other two black persons were removed for cause. The trial court de-
cided, over the strenuous objection of the defense, to hear the prosecution's
reasons for its challenges in camera. After hearing those reasons and de-
nying the defense's motion to disallow the peremptories, the court declined
to reveal any of the hearing's record to the defense.29
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Sixth Circuit relied on the
lack of mandatory procedural standards in either Batson or Booker v.
Jabe,30 and on Snyder v. Massachusetts,31 which held that a defendant's
right to be present at a particular stage of trial was a fact-specific deter-
mination. The court in Davis also based part of its decision on the de-
fense's opportunity to present its arguments in open court before the court
held the in camera hearing. 2
In United States v. Tucker,33 the trial court had conducted an ex parte,
in camera hearing after the prosecution exercised four of its seven pe-
remptory challenges to exclude all four blacks on the thirty-six person
panel. The Seventh Circuit upheld the proceeding,34 agreeing with the
Sixth Circuit that "Batson neither requires rebuttal of the government's
reasons by the defense, nor does it forbid a district court to hold an adver-
sarial hearing.""
In the interim between these two cases, a divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Thompson 8 disagreed with Davis. The prose-
cution had exercised its peremptory challenges to remove all four blacks
from the venire. After hearing the prosecutor's reasons ex parte and in
camera, the trial judge allowed the peremptories without revealing any of
the proffered reasons37 to the defendant.3"
In overturning "the district court, the Ninth Circuit rejected the govern-
29. Davis, 809 F.2d at 1200.
30. 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001, affd on reconsideration, 801 F.2d
871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987). Booker was one of the two federal cases
prior to Batson that held that the Sixth Amendment applied to a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges. See supra note 4.
31. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
32. This approach ignores the additional information defense rebuttal could bring to a Batson
hearing after the prosecutor has given his reasons, such as showing the prosecutor's reasons to be
pretextual by, for example, pointing out non-black venirepersons who possess characteristics similar to
those of the black venirepersons who were challenged. The court's broad language underscored its
view on the trial court's discretion: After the defense has established a prima facie case of racial
motivation, defense "participation was no longer necessary for the district court to make its determina-
tion. At that point, the district court was entitled to hear from the Government under whatever cir-
cumstances the district court felt appropriate." Davis, 809 F.2d at 1202 (emphasis added).
33. 836 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989).
34. Despite its conclusion, the court stated that it believed adversarial hearings to be the "appro-
priate method for handling most Batson-type disputes." Id. at 340. It did not, however, require them.
35. Id.
36. 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987).
37. The prosecutor's statements included: "She looked really sullen, and she just, I mean it was
like a glare. I felt very uncomfortable with her, and I wouldn't put her on"; "I thought he lived in the
neighborhood-he's black, too, and he was dressed casually, and I thought he might identify with him
too much so I excused him." Id. at 1256 n.1.
38. Id. at 1256.
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ment's argument that defense counsel could contribute nothing to the pro-
ceeding by being present and participating. The court also questioned the
government's administrative burden argument, stating that "[w]e would
be surprised . . . if these proceedings were to involve anything more elab-
orate than the prosecutor's articulation of his reasons, followed by the ar-
gument of defense counsel . ...""
In United States v. Garrison,4 ° the Fourth Circuit adopted the Ninth
Circuit's standard, concluding that "the important rights guaranteed by
Batson deserve the full protection of the adversarial process except where
compelling reasons requiring secrecy are shown."'" In United States v.
Roan Eagle, 2 the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits that the defense should have an opportunity to rebut the prosecution,
but it refused to require a full evidentiary hearing.
B. State Cases
State courts have also confronted the issue of the most appropriate pro-
cedure for conducting a Batson inquiry into prosecutorial motives for pe-
remptory challenges. These courts have either read the Title VII language
in Batson as mandating the framework for deciding a claim of discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges43 or assumed that the defendant must be al-
lowed to rebut the prosecutor's reasons.44
III. REQUIRING THE PRESENCE OF DEFENDANTS AT Batson
HEARINGS
This Section addresses the importance of allowing the defendant to be
present at a Batson hearing. It argues that: (1) the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) re-
39. Id. at 1259-60. In addition, the court considered the argument that an adversary hearing is
inappropriate because the government lawyer may be required to reveal confidential matters of tactics
and strategy, potentially impairing his ability to prosecute the case. Although the court found this
reason not to be a sufficient justification in that particular case, it did adopt an exception to its general
requirement of open, adversarial proceedings. The court held that a judge can examine the prosecu-
tor's reasons ex parte and in camera if the prosecutor claims that the reasons relate to case strategy
and the judge agrees after a separate in camera hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this exception to
the adversarial requirement in United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1987).
40. 849 F.2d 103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988).
41. Id. at 106.
42. 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1764 (1989).
43. See Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 62, 542 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1988) ("We read Batson as
allowing rebuttal as per the Title VII cases."); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 63 (Mo. 1987) (en
bane) ("Batson intimates that it should be read side-by-side with the Supreme Court's Title VII
cases.").
44. See Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala. 1987) (defense can offer evidence that reasons
are sham or pretext); Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 258, 562 A.2d 1278, 1282 (1989) (trial judge
should offer defense opportunity to rebut prosecutor's explanations); Williams v. State, 507 So. 2d 50,
53 (Miss. 1987) (defense afforded opportunity to challenge and rebut explanations); State v. Jackson,
322 N.C. 251, 258, 368 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988) (defense allowed to offer evidence to strengthen case
after prosecution made showing).
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quire the defendant's presence at a Batson hearing; and (2) an examina-
tion of the few situations in the criminal process where the defense is
excluded argues against exclusion from Batson hearings.
A. Constitutional Right to Presence
1. Gagnon and Stincer
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment45 is the source of a
criminal defendant's right to be present at every stage of the trial.' The
right applies in state as well as federal proceedings.47 Even in situations
where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evi-
dence-and, therefore, not implicating the literal provisions of the Sixth
Amendment 8-the defendant's right to be present is protected by the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."9 Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 43(a) codifies this constitutional requirement.5"
The starting point for analyzing a defendant's claim to be present at a
Batson hearing is the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a "leading
principle . . . [pervading] the entire law of criminal procedure is that,
after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the pris-
45. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
46. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); see also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,
453-55 (1912) (defendant in felony case has right to attend all stages of trial from impaneling of jury
to delivery of verdict).
47. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
48. In a Batson hearing the only "witness" against the defendant is the prosecuting attorney, and
the "evidence" is not of the type that will be used against the defendant at trial.
49. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam). The due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment states, "No person shall ...be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The equivalent clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Court has also held that the defendant's right to be present at
all critical stages of the trial is a "fundamental right." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 (1983).
50. "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of
the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule." FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a). When Rule 43 was
enacted, it was intended to be a statement of the law existing at the time. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43
advisory committee's notes, [1 1. The Supreme Court has not subsequently defined the contours of
Rule 43 relative to the Constitution. Some courts have stated that Rule 43 extends beyond the Consti-
tution, including the protections afforded by the common law right of presence, as well as the Sixth
Amendment confrontation clause and the due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Alessandrello,
637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981); United States v. Brown, 571
F.2d 980, 986 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1978). Contra United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1972) (rule no more than restatement of defendant's constitutional rights). The minimum guar-
antee of Rule 43 extends at least as far as the Constitution in requiring the defendant's presence at a
Batson hearing. Therefore, an appellate court's inquiry into the defendant's right to be present at a
Batson hearing should not end with the Constitution, especially because the language of the Rule
explicitly states that the defendant should be present at the "impaneling of the jury." But see United
States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1202 (6th Cir.) ("unpersuaded" that Rule 43 requires defendant's
presence at Batson hearing), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007-08 (1987).
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oner." 1 Two recent Supreme Court cases have outlined the standards for
determining whether a defendant has a right to be present at a particular
trial-related proceeding.
In United States v. Gagnon,52 the Supreme Court stated that a defend-
ant has a due process right to be present when the defendant's presence
has "a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to
defend against the charge.""3 In Kentucky v. Stincer," the Court reiter-
ated and refined the Gagnon standard, stating that "a defendant is guar-
anteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that
is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of
the procedure." '55
51. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892). The trial starts "at least from the time
when the work of empanelling the jury begins." Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884).
52. 470 U.S. 522 (1985) (per curiam). In Gagnon a juror expressed concern after noticing that
defendant Gagnon was drawing sketches of the jurors. The judge, juror, and Gagnon's counsel con-
ferred in camera to determine the juror's impartiality. The Supreme Court ruled that Gagnon's ab-
sence was not a due process violation, stating that the defendant could neither have contributed to nor
gained from being present at the conference. In fact, the Court said, the defendant's presence could
have been counterproductive in trying to determine whether the juror's concerns had affected imparti-
ality. The Court concluded that the defendant's presence was not required to ensure either fundamen-
tal fairness or a reasonable opportunity to construct a defense. Id. at 527. The Court also held that
the defendant waived any rights he may have had by failing to object at the time of the conference. Id.
at 529.
53. Id. at 526.
54. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
55. Id. at 745. Like Gagnon and Stincer, the typical presence case arises on appeal when a
defendant raises a claim that he was not present at a proceeding at which the defendant's attorney was
present. Courts analyze such a claim by looking at the stage of the criminal process, by asking
whether the defendant was represented by counsel at the proceeding, and, finally, by inquiring
whether the defendant's interests were adequately protected by the defense counsel. For example, in
United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the D.C. Circuit held that the defendant
had a statutory right under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and a constitu-
tional right to be present at voir dire despite the defense counsel's presence. Other cases have held that
the defendant's interests were protected by the presence of defense counsel. For example, in United
States v. Boone, 759 F.2d 345 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 861 (1985), the Fourth Circuit held
that the absence of the defendant from an in camera conference concerning the dismissal of a juror
was not a constitutional violation so long as counsel for the defendant was present. Courts do this
under the rubric of a harmless error analysis: If the defense counsel's representation is adequate and
thus the defendant's absence does not affect the outcome, the absence of the defendant is treated as
irrelevant. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "Harmless Error: Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court stated that the
purpose of the harmless error rule was to avoid "setting aside convictions for small errors or defects
that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial." Id. at 22.
When a court uses harmless error analysis and asks whether the defendant's interests were ade-
quately represented by defense counsel, the court implies that the stage of the trial is one in which the
defendant has a right to be present. If the stage of the trial were not one in which the defendant has
the right to be present, then the court would simply dispose of the case. Therefore, Gagnon and
Stincer, and other cases that address a defendant's right to be present by looking at whether the
defendant's interests were adequately represented by defense counsel, suggest that trial courts should
allow defendants to be present at those stages. On appeal they may be analyzed under a harmless
error standard if the defendant was not present, but the existence of this safety net on appeal does not
mean that trial judges should not allow defense presence at the stage in question.
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2. Application to Batson Hearings
A defendant's absence at a Batson hearing would violate the Gagnon
standard because a Batson hearing has a reasonably substantial relation-
ship to a defendant's opportunity to defend against the ultimate charge.
The defendant's right to be present applies to jury selection, including
that phase involving the exercise of peremptory challenges. 6 Since a Bat-
son hearing is an integral part of the jury selection process, the right to be
present should also apply to that proceeding. A fair and just hearing is
thwarted by the defendant's absence since the defendant will not witness
the determination of the group that will decide his guilt or innocence.
Unlike Gagnon, in which a defendant's presence at an in camera con-
ference was considered counterproductive, 5" a defendant could both gain
from and contribute to a Batson hearing. By being present to hear the
prosecutor's reasons, a defendant could gain the sense of fairness that the
Supreme Court has recognized as an important element of the criminal
justice system. By rebutting a prosecutor's reasons, the defense could also
contribute to the search for the true reasons behind the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges. The defendant's presence at a Batson hearing
could not be counterproductive as in Gagnon, since the issue is not the
impartiality of a fearful juror but the prosecutor's reasons for her peremp-
tory challenges. Further, unlike Gagnon, where none of the defendants
objected at trial, the defense has generally objected when a Batson hearing
has been held ex parte and in camera.58
A Batson hearing also would meet the "critical to the outcome" and the
"contribution to fairness" elements of the Stincer standard. There is little
doubt that the composition of juries is and has been treated as critical to
the ultimate verdict. Numerous Supreme Court pronouncements have con-
firmed the importance of the jury's composition." The very existence of
peremptory challenges and the extraordinary amount of time spent on voir
dire6 ° demonstrate the perceived importance of the jury selection proce-
dure in the outcome of the trial.
56. United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Hob-
son v. United States, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, 237 (8th Cir.
1974). For an example of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the jury selection process as a critical
stage of the criminal proceeding, see Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989) (Federal Magis-
trates Act does not authorize magistrates to conduct voir dire). The Court in Gomez cited Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892), in "affirming voir dire as a critical stage of the criminal
proceeding, during which the defendant has a constitutional right to be present." Gomez, 109 S. Ct. at
2246.
57. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 520.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1988) ("All the defendants
objected to an ex parte procedure."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989).
59. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84
n.3 (1986).
60. An eleven-county study in New York, a jurisdiction that retains attorney-conducted voir dire,
discovered that voir dire took longer than the trial itself in 20% of 462 cases studied by the New York
Governor's Commission on Administation of Justice. The average voir dire took 12.7 hours, which
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In addition, the presence of the defendant would meet the second part
of the Stincer standard since it contributes both to the actual fairness of
the procedure and to the appearance of fairness. As the Court stated in In
re Murchison,61 "[f]airness of course requires an absence of actual bias in
the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness."62 Thus, "due process is denied by cir-
cumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias."
'6 3 Ex-
cluding the defendant from a hearing that determines who will sit on the
jury, besides presenting opportunities for actual bias, certainly creates the
appearance of bias.
B. Total Exclusion of the Defense
The rarity of instances where criminal proceedings are permissible in
the absence of defense presence further argues against holding a Batson
hearing without the defense, Courts exclude the defense when determining
whether evidence possessed by the prosecution is discoverable by the de-
fense.6 Similarly, prosecutors reveal the identities of informers to the
court in camera because disclosing their identities might cause harm to the
informers.65 The use of an in camera hearing enables the court to weigh
the balance of interests between the accused and the government without
revealing the information unnecessarily and irretrievably.
The general rule that emerges from these examples is that hearings are
held without any defense presence only when the court must initially de-
cide if a compelling,justification exists for the government not to reveal
certain evidence. The defense is precluded from receiving the information
only after a court makes this initial determination.
IV. ALLOWING DEFENSE REBUTTAL OF THE PROSECUTION'S
REASONS
The previous Section argued that a defendant's right to be present to
hear the prosecutor's reasons for his peremptory challenges is a require-
ment of both the Constitution and Rule 43(a), and is consistent with the
presumption of presence at all stages of the criminal process. This Section
argues that, once defense presence is established as a right, policy reasons
was 40% of the time of the entire case. Chambers, IVho Should Pick Jurors, Attorneys or the Judge,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1983, at B4, col. 3.
61. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
62. Id. at 166.
63. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
64. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1982) (court should ex-
amine in camera whether evidence is relevant for discovery).
65. See United States v. Sharp, 778 F.2d 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 1985) (court must conduct in
camera interview of informant before disclosing identity), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1030 (1986).
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favor allowing the defense to rebut the prosecution's reasons before the
court decides whether to allow the peremptory challenge in question.
A. Detection of Discrimination
1. Batson
The process of determining whether a prosecutor has exercised her
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner places an enor-
mous burden on the trial court judge.6 Since purposeful racial discrimi-
nation is difficult to detect,' 7 defense rebuttal of the prosecution's reasons
for challenging certain venirepersons can assist the judge in his determina-
tion by pointing out how the prosecution's explanations do not conform to
the facts. For example, the defense counsel could show that white jurors
who are similarly situated to the challenged blacks were not challenged.68
Participation by the defense also would help guard against "outright
prevarication,"" "[a] prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious ra-
cism,"70 or "[a] judge's own conscious or unconscious racism." ' Justice
Marshall feared that these factors could limit the effort to rid the jury
selection process of racial discrimination. Because of this possibility, his
concurrence in Batson argued that the only way to end racial discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process is to eliminate peremptory challenges
entirely.
72
Justice Powell's majority opinion answered Justice Marshall's skepti-
cism about prosecutorial and judicial enforcement of Batson by stating
somewhat conclusorily that there was "no reason to believe that prosecu-
tors will not fulfill their duty to exercise their challenges only for legiti-
66. See State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987):
The trial judge's task is extremely difficult. One doubts that a prosecutor will admit that his
decision to challenge a particular member of the venire was based upon race. . . . Batson thus
requires the trial judge to embrace a participatory role in voir dire, noting the subtle nuance of
both verbal and nonverbal communication from each member of the venire and from the prose-
cutor himself.
67. The Supreme Court adopted the discriminatory purpose standard for equal protection claims
in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Batson may represent a step away from Washington v.
Davis, because it can shift the burden of proof to the prosecutor by allowing evidence of result-a
"pattern of strikes" during voir dire-to show purpose. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97
(1986).
68. This method seems to be the best way to show discrimination after the prosecutor has prof-
fered her reasons, since reasons given to challenge black venirepersons may also apply to white
venirepersons who were not challenged. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 511 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (disparate treatment of black and white venirepersons "strong evidence [of] subterfuge to
avoid admitting discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge"); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 330,
357 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1987) (trial court's finding clearly erroneous because, among other reasons,
"similarly situated white jurors were not challenged").
69. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 107.
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mate purposes," 73 and that "trial judges, in supervising voir dire . . . will
be alert to identify a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. '7
If this were true, Batson never would have been necessary. In Swain v.
Alabama, the Court stated that prosecutors could not deny blacks "the
same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice
enjoyed by the white population. ' 5 Yet discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges remained widespread after Swain .7  The language
in Swain prohibiting discrimination obviously did not succeed; reliance
solely on the good faith of prosecutors is misguided in light of the history
of peremptory challenges in the period between Swain and Batson.
The problem with detection of racial discrimination in the jury selection
process extends beyond discovering overt racism. Examples of subtle
stereotyping and racism point out the need to require defense rebuttal of
the prosecution's reasons, since arguably much racism and racial stere-
otyping is lodged in the subconscious and will stay there unless forced into
the open. 8
The assistance of the defense is also necessary because Batson does not
prescribe a result but rather proscribes disriminatory purpose. Some
courts have had difficulty finding a Batson prima facie case when a black
remains on the petit jury despite evidence that a disproportionate number
of peremptory challenges were used to strike blacks from the venire.7 1
This is an incorrect reading of Batson. A court may not simply ensure
that an adequate number of blacks remain on the petit jury; rather, the
judge must look into the circumstances of each peremptory challenge.8"
73. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22.
74. Id.
75. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965).
76. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring); Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
77. Professor Lawrence has recently indicated how racial discrimination or stereotyping can occur
even among white persons apparently strongly opposed to racial discrimination. Lawrence, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
Lawrence used examples from modern life to illustrate his point that stereotypes may be present in
persons not thought to be racists. Howard Cosell, a consistent champion of the rights of black athletes,
referred to a professional football receiver as a "little monkey" on national television. Id. at 339-40.
Nancy Reagan spoke to a group of supporters and remarked that she wished her husband could have
been present to see all the "beautiful white people." Id. at 340. Lawrence concluded that "[riacism
continues to be aided and abetted by self-conscious bigots and well-meaning liberals alike." Id. at 387.
78. See id. at 322 ("We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influ-
enced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words,
a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation.").
79. This of course raises the question of what constitutes a prima facie case. Some courts have
used a statistical basis for their decision, stating that a prima facie case is not raised when the jury
includes a substantial number of blacks, while others have probed more deeply into the prosecution's
actions. Compare United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 1987) (no remand since
jury accepted by prosecution included two of four blacks in original venire) with Stanley v. State, 313
Md. 50, 72-75, 542 A.2d 1267, 1278-79 (1988) (prima facie case made even though three blacks
remained on jury). See generally Alschuler, supra note 14, at 170-73.
80. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
19891
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 187
Because Batson mandates this difficult inquiry into purpose, the role of
the trial judge is better suited to allowing the defense to rebut the prosecu-
tion before the judge decides whether to allow a particular peremptory
challenge than it is to acting as the sole questioner of the prosecution, as
must occur when the judge is without the aid of the defense.8
2. Sixth Amendment Analysis
To prevent discrimination that Batson does not reach, some courts have
relied upon the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury com-
posed of a representative cross-section of the community rather than upon
the equal protection clause, which Batson utilized." A Batson-type stan-
dard has been used but, unlike Batson, has been restricted neither to
venirepersons of the same race as the defendant8" nor to race as the only
factor triggering inquiry.84
For example, in Booker v. Jabe,85 the Sixth Circuit used the Sixth
Amendment as the basis for prohibiting a prosecutor's discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges, but did not go so far as to prescribe a result.
Instead, under Booker, a prima facie showing is made if "(1) the group
81. The American criminal justice system is based upon adversarial argument. Arguing the infer-
ences to be drawn from all the testimony and pointing out the weaknesses in the other side's position
helps to sharpen and clarify the issues for the factfinder. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862
(1975).
Typically, the judge renders decision after hearing the arguments of both sides. Placing the judge in
an adversarial position, as a closed Batson hearing necessarily does, forces him away from the normal
judicial role of objective arbiter. Therefore, to avoid compromising the judicial function and the
judge's role as detached decisionmaker, Batson hearings should involve the full arguments of the
attorneys and thus include opportunity for defense rebuttal.
82. Some courts relying on the Sixth Amendment or a state equivalent of the Sixth Amendment
did so prior to Batson to overcome the formidable burden of proof under Swain. See, e.g., People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 358, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). Others have used the Sixth
Amendement since Batson to cover a white defendant-black juror situation, since Batson applies only
to jurors of the same race as the defendant. See, e.g., Gardner v. State, 157 Ariz. 541, 544-46, 760
P.2d 541, 544-46 (1988); Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). For cases
holding that Batson does not apply to the white defendant-black juror situation, see United States v.
Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Batson does not apply to white defendant
tried with black defendants); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (Batson
mandates defendant be of same race as excluded juror). The Court will hear arguments this term in
Holland v. Illinois, 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989), to
determine if either the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury covers the white defendant-black juror situation.
Extending the right to a non-discriminatory jury selection process to defendants not of the same
race as the juror is a logical extension of Batson. Batson spoke of harm to the excluded juror and the
community, as well as to the defendant, when venirepersons are excluded because of race. Batson, 476
U.S. at 87. Therefore, the race of the defendant should not be the only relevant factor. A good exam-
ple of discrimination against jurors regardless of the defendant's race is contained in a Dallas County
District Attorney's Office manual, which stated that prosecutors should not look for "any member of a
minority group" when picking jurors. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 152-53.
83. See, e.g., Gardner, 157 Ariz. at 546, 760 P.2d at 546; Seubert, 749 S.W.2d at 588.
84. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488-89, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (using state
constitution to prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, color, creed or national origin), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 881 (1979).
85. 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001, affd on reconsideration, 801 F.2d
871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987).
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alleged to be excluded is a cognizable group in the community, and (2)
there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to this exclu-
sion [were] made on the basis of the individual venirepersons' group affili-
ation . . . ." Since discrimination under such a standard will be as diffi-
cult to detect as in Batson and will require the same type of inquiry into
prosecutorial motives, an adversary hearing procedure allowing for de-
fense presence and rebuttal should also apply to jurisdictions using a Sixth
Amendment standard, such as the one in Booker.
87
B. Standard of Appellate Review
In Batson the Court noted that a trial court's ruling on a claim of a
Batson violation will largely be an "evaluation of credibility."88 Because
of this, "a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great def-
erence." '89 This past Term in Tompkins v. Texas,90 an equally divided
Supreme Court upheld without opinion an extremely deferential standard
of appellate review of a trial court decision on a Batson claim. The lower
court in Tompkins found that "the prosecuting attorney's reasons . . .
constitute a racially neutral explanation, and it is not the office of this
Court to judge her credibility."'" The lower court also stated that whether
it "would have made the same judgment as the trial judge did is unimpor-
tant, because her conclusion, given a subjective belief in the truth of the
prosecuting attorneys' explanations, which is supported by sufficient evi-
dence, comports with that of a rational trier of fact."92
The issue of the defense's role during the prosecution's response to its
prima facie case is intertwined with the standard of appellate review. If
the Court is to continue its standard of "great deference," then it is even
more vital to require defense participation in order to ensure, first, that
the trial judge is forced to confront all the facts; and, second, that an ade-
quate record is developed for genuine appellate review since the absence
86. Id. at 773; see also State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 535-36, 511 A.2d 1150, 1164 (1986)
(adopting standard similar to Booker in a post-Batson case).
87. If the Court holds in Holland v. Illinois, 121 Il1. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989), that the Sixth Amendment applies to the petit jury and requires
neither that race be the only prohibited basis of discrimination nor that the venireperson in question
be of the same cognizable group as the defendant, the Court should dictate a procedure in which the
defense is presented an opportunity to rebut the prosecution after the prosecution has presented rea-
sons for its peremptory challenges.
88. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
89. Id.
90. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), affg by an equally divided Court No. 68,870 (Texas Crim. App.
Oct. 7, 1987) (WESTLAW, State directory, TX-CS database), 1987 WL 906.
91. Tompkins v. State, No. 68,870 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 1987) (WESTLAW, State directory,
TX-CS database), 1987 WL 906, at 51. One of the prosecutor's reasons for striking a black postal
worker was that the prosecutor did not have "very good luck with postal employees." Id. at 50.
92. Id. at 52.
19891
The Yale Law Journal
of defense participation will leave important facts out of the record and
make it virtually impossible to overrule a trial court's decision.93
C. Administrative Costs
An argument such as the one raised by the government in United States
v. Thompson"'-that the administrative costs of an adversary hearing will
outweigh the benefits-misses on three counts. First, almost all constitu-
tional guarantees involve administrative costs. Second, since the amount of
time for both sides to state their arguments, rebut the other side, and let
the judge rule should be very short, and usually less than going into
chambers to hear the prosecution's reasons, the administrative burden in
terms of time spent is very slight.95 Third, if administrative cost is the
primary goal, the best solution would be to abolish the peremptory chal-
lenge altogether since that would reduce the burden to its minimum
level.96
The procedure this Note advocates could lengthen voir dire for two rea-
sons: Prosecutors who wish to remove a group from the jury may want to
ask more questions in order to have neutral justifications to point to, and
defense attorneys in response may want to ask more questions to elicit
answers that show the prosecutor's reasons to be pretextual. However,
judges retain great discretion over the content of questions that may be
asked at voir dire.9 7 In exercising this power, judges should not allow
extensive "fishing expeditions" in voir dire by prosecutors attempting to
avoid the Batson restrictions. 8 Judges could accomplish this by, for exam-
ple, setting time limits, reviewing questions the attorneys wish to ask prior
to voir dire, or conducting voir dire themselves, as is already done in some
jurisdictions.99
93. See Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and
Capricious Equal Protection, 74 Va. L. Rev. 811, 835-36 (1988) (use of ex pane, in camera proceed-
ings freezes analysis of Batson claims in their infancy).
94. 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987).
95. For a similar argument, see id. at 1259-60; Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 258-60, 562 A.2d
1278, 1282-83 (1989).
96. In his concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall advocated complete elimination of peremptory
challenges because he believed it to be the only way to eliminate discrimination from the jury selection
process. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring). Elimination of peremptory challenges
could occur if those concerned most with removing discrimination and those concerned most with trial
speed unite as critics of the continued use of peremptory challenges.
97. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
98. It is also possible that defense counsel may use a Batson challenge as a tool of harassment.
One commentator almost invites such abuse by suggesting that "[piroperly used, [Batson] can become
an important weapon in the defense arsenal." JURYWORK § 4.07[31 (E. Krauss & B. Bonora eds.
1989). However, since even one challenge against a same-race juror may raise a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination, harassment, in effect, could never be proved. Defense counsel's subjective
purpose may be to harass the prosecution as well as to prevent blacks from being excluded from the
jury, but the result remains the same: Most same-race peremptory challenges will have to be ex-
plained by the prosecutor if the defense objects.
99. See V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION, AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY




Although many authors have advocated the elimination of peremptory
challenges because they believe that discrimination cannot otherwise be
eliminated from the jury selection process,O'° an adversary hearing proce-
dure could deter and thus eliminate most, if not all, of the discrimination
in the jury selection process while retaining some form of the peremptory
challenge, which has historically been an important part of the protection
afforded both defendants and the government at trial.0'0
The difference between the deterrent value of Swain and that of Batson
is that Swain was basically a toothless rejoinder to prosecutors that they
should not discriminate, while Batson requires prosecutors to articulate
reasons for their challenges. An adversarial Batson hearing further re-
quires a prosecutor, knowing that the defense counsel will be poised to
attack any hint of racial motivation, to have truly neutral reasons for the
peremptory challenges that she exercises. Forcing a prosecutor to state
reasons in an adversary hearing-and possibly under cross-examination if
the judge so desires-should help to deter many if not all uses of discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges.
E. Exceptions to the Adversary Hearing Requirement
A prosecutor may have a legitimate reason for not wanting the defense
to hear her reasons for a peremptory challenge. Nevertheless, courts must
limit any exception to the general rule.
Prosecutors have claimed that open disclosure of their reasons for pe-
remptory challenges will reveal case strategy to the defense.0 2 In United
States v. Thompson,'0 3 the Ninth Circuit, although forbidding ex parte, in
camera Batson hearings, carved out an exception to its general rule for
circumstances where a prosecutor claims that revealing reasons for his pe-
remptory challenges would divulge case strategy. 04 Allowing case strategy
ily responsible in 18 states, judges and attorneys share in 19 states, 75% of federal judges allow no
oral attorney participation).
100. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring) ; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at
167-69; Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and
Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026
(1987); Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986); Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1989). But see Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27
STAN. L. REv. 545, 552 (1975) (approving peremptory challenge because it "avoids trafficking in the
core of truth in most common stereotypes").
101. One commentator has suggested that "[airguably Batson's force, if any, will lie in the deter-
rent effect it will have upon prosecutors." Wilson, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the "New" Peremptory
Challenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder v. West Virginia?, 20 AKRON L. REv. 355, 364
k1986).
102. The Ninth Circuit addressed such a claim in United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254,
1259 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. Id.
104. In that situation the trial judge is to conduct an initial ex parte, in camera hearing to hear
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as an exception to a general rule of adversary hearings is too open-ended,
for just as prosecutors have become expert in articulating "neutral" rea-
sons for their challenges in the aftermath of Batson,0 5 so too they could
relate their peremptory challenges to case strategy in an attempt to obtain
an ex parte, in camera hearing. This exception to a general policy of ad-
versary hearings thus serves to undermine the values that the policy was
intended to preserve. As the court in Tucker correctly stated, "the Thomp-
son exception swallows the Thompson rule.'
0 6
The case strategy exception rests on the assumption that a prosecutor's
sole duty is to win a case' 7 and that disclosing case strategy to the defense
would create an unfair playing field. Much of the debate over peremptory
challenges prior to Batson similarly concerned the idea that the trial is a
game in which each side should be allowed to carry its fight to the ful-
lest.' 5 However, the Supreme Court has recognized the folly of seeing
trials as mere sporting events. In upholding a Florida notice-of-alibi rule,
which required that a defendant give notice in advance of trial if he in-
tended to claim an alibi, the Court stated: "[t]he adversary system of trial
is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy
an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.'
0 9
An exception to the general policy of adversarial Batson hearings
should be allowed only for a "compelling reason." A "compelling reason"
occurs only when harm to persons unconnected with that criminal pro-
ceeding may result from disclosure, such as when a prosecutor strikes a
the relationship to case strategy; if the judge concludes that revealing the prosecutor's motives to the
defense may be prejudicial to the prosecution's case, then the trial court judge has the discretion to
hear the reasons for the peremptory challenges in an ex parte, in camera hearing.
105. Some reasons that courts have allowed prosecutors to use are of questionable racial neutral-
ity. See, e.g., United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (5th Cir. 1987) (one venireperson
was young, single, and unemployed while defendant was young, separated and experiencing financial
hardship, another venireperson avoided eye contact, and third venireperson was divorced and had low
income); United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1986) (one venireperson appeared
hostile to prosecutor). While these reasons may seem acceptable, allowing such reasons leaves an easy
out for prosecutors determined to obtain the most favorable jury possible: merely "uncovering" similar
reasons to use in future trials. Since the substantive protection of Batson can be evaded, a strong
procedural framework such as the one advocated in this Note is necessary if discrimination is to be
eliminated, or at least reduced.
106. United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989).
107. On the contrary, a prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
108. The debate over criminal discovery illustrates the demise, over time, of that view of the
criminal process. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 97, § 19.3, at 474-82. In other contexts, the
prosecution has been required to disclose evidence to the defense. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose material evidence that is favorable to defense); Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (informer's privilege must give way where disclosure of identity, or
of contents of communication, is relevant and helpful to defense of accused, or is essential to fair
determination of cause).
109. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970); see also Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279 (1963) (arguing for discovery in crimi-
nal cases).
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venireperson because that venireperson is the subject of another criminal
investigation."'
If a "compelling reason" is present and the judge grants the prosecu-
tor's request to give her reasons in camera, the judge should ensure that a
court reporter is present to record the hearing. Then the defense should be
presented with a transcript of the hearing with such redactions as the
judge deems necessary to preserve the rights of persons not connected to
the criminal proceeding. This procedure is the best way to balance the
competing concerns of the defendant and of ongoing criminal investiga-
tions or persons not involved in the defendant's trial.
V. FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
The previous Sections have argued that courts must allow the defense to
be present and to rebut the prosecution during Batson hearings."' This
Section considers whether courts should require prosecutors, after the de-
fense has made out a prima facie case, to testify under oath to the reasons
for their peremptories, to answer the defense counsel's questions on cross-
examination, and to respond to questions that the trial judge may have.
Because of the administrative burden that would result, appellate courts
should not require this procedure, except in hearings on remand, but they
should permit them. Therefore, the decision should be entirely within the
discretion of the trial judge.1 2
110. See United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.) (example of compelling excep-
tion is government investigation of potential juror's involvement in other crimes), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 566 (1988); Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 257-58, 562 A.2d 1278, 1282 (1989).
111. A variation on the question of what procedure to use for hearing a prosecutor's reasons is
whether a prosecutor's written submissions that are in addition to or in lieu of her arguments in open
court should be subject to the defendant's examination. Two panels of the Fourth Circuit have re-
cently addressed this issue and upheld ex parte, in camera examinations of the prosecutorial papers.
United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3176 (1989); United
States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988).
These decisions are incorrect. Although courts may ask for written arguments, they should not
compel submission of the prosecutor's notes. When the prosecutor's notes are voluntarily submitted or
when written arguments are made to the court, the judge should treat the prosecutor's writing in the
same way they handle a prosecutor's request for an ex parte, in camera oral hearing: The written
submission, whether it is notes from the jury selection process or a written argument, should be
disclosed to the defense except for a "compelling reason." To prevent surprise and to balance the
scales, trial courts should inform prosecutors of this rule before any writings are submitted.
112. One problem with requiring or even conducting a full evidentiary hearing is that in such a
hearing the prosecutor must act as both an advocate and a witness. This dual role may appear to
conflict with Rule 3.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983) states:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness except where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony re-
lates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the
lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
This concern is misguided in the context of a Batson hearing because Rule 3.7 is directed towards
protecting the rights of the opposing party. The comment to the Rule states: "The opposing party has
proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 comment (1983). In a Batson hearing the
defendant is the party making the request for a full-scale hearing. Therefore, a court should not deny
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A. Balancing the Benefits and Burdens in the Typical Batson Hearing
Appellate courts that have reviewed trial court denial of a defendant's
motion to subject the prosecutor to cross-examination have not required
such a procedure."' They wish to avoid the administrative burden of a
"trial within a trial.' 1 4 This burden is not outweighed by the benefits of
the full evidentiary hearing since the additional benefits are usually slight.
An adversary hearing in which the parties argue their cases and the de-
fense rebuts will usually be sufficient for the judge to make an informed
decision," 5 thus making a full evidentiary hearing unnecessary in the ma-
jority of cases.
Although no court has yet required a full-scale evidentiary hearing,
trial courts should be allowed to conduct such a hearing when, in their
discretion, it would be warranted. Therefore, appellate courts should leave
this decision entirely within the discretion of the trial judge and neither
forbid nor require such a hearing.
B. Balancing in the Batson Hearing on Remand
When an appellate court finds a potential Batson violation and re-
mands the case to the trial level, the appellate court should require that
the trial court conduct a full evidentiary hearing. When a court remands a
case, it has found some problem that needs to be addressed by the trial
court. In such a case, forcing a prosecutor to state reasons under oath, and
subject to cross-examination, ensures that the remand is properly handled.
Since the amount of time between the original jury selection process and
the hearing on remand is likely to be great, testimony under oath and
cross-examination will serve as a useful aid in the attempt to reconstruct
the earlier event.
In terms of burden, the major difference between the typical Batson
hearing and the hearing on remand is the number of times that each oc-
curs. Since Batson hearings on remand should be rare, requiring a fuller
hearing would not overly burden the courts in the way that holding such a
procedure at every Batson hearing would." 6
a defendant's motion to put the prosecutor on the stand solely because of a potential violation of Rule
3.7. Additionally, courts should not be constrained from using this procedure sua sponte, unless the
defendant objects.
113. United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988);
Powell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 878, 372 S.E.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1988); Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562
A.2d 1278 (1989); State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988).
114. Jackson, 322 N.C. at 258, 368 S.E.2d at 842; see also Garrison, 849 F.2d at 106 ("Although
a district court could conduct such a hearing if it believed circumstance warranted it, Batson does not
require this intrusion on the trial proceedings."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988).
115. See Jackson, 322 N.C. at 258, 368 S.E.2d at 842 ("presiding judges are capable of passing
on the credibility of prosecuting attorneys without the benefit of cross-examination").
116. In several cases involving Batson hearings on remand, the trial court has conducted a full
evidentiary hearing with sworn testimony by the prosecutor and cross-examination by the defense. See
Shelton v. State, 521 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 562 A.2d




Allowing the defense to be present to hear the prosecution's reasons and
to rebut them whenever a prima facie case of discrimination is made elim-
inates the truly "peremptory" nature of the peremptory challenge. The
Supreme Court, however, recognized this consequence in Batson and sub-
ordinated it to a goal of removing racial discrimination. Swain represented
an attempt to preserve the "peremptory" nature of the challenge, but the
dreadful accounts of the use of peremptory challenges in the years be-
tween Swain and Batson convinced the Supreme Court that it could no
longer allow these practices.
Courts must not allow the spirit of Batson to be diminished by mis-
guided allegiance to the peremptory challenge. Batson is an attempt to
remove discrimination from the jury selection process without eliminating
the peremptory challenge. The balance is delicate, but Batson's movement
is towards the eradication of discrimination and away from a truly "pe-
remptory" challenge. The post-Batson peremptory is forever changed; al-
lowing ex parte, in camera hearings serves to limit that change and the
rights it was intended to protect.
Courts should not read Batson as mandating a procedure, since it did
not, but should go beyond Batson and require both the presence and par-
ticipation of the defendant at the Batson determination unless there is a
compelling reason for an in camera hearing. This procedure helps to se-
cure the rights of defendants, the excluded jurors,"' and the community118
and provides both fairness and the appearance of fairness, fundamental
values in the American criminal justice system.
hearing).
In Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 562 A.2d 1278 (1989), the court held that a trial judge's refusal in
a Batson remand hearing to require the prosecutor to testify under oath or to permit cross-examina-
tion was not an abuse of discretion. When an appellate court is confronted with an appeal after a
remand hearing, the decision in Gray is appropriate, so long as the court is satisfied with the proce-
dure utilized by the trial court. However, when an appellate court initially remands a case to the trial
court, it should explicitly require a full evidentiary hearing.
117. "[T]he Court [has] recognized that by denying a person participation in jury service on ac-
count of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminatels] against the excluded juror." Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
118. Id. (discriminatory jury selection "underminels] public confidence in the fairness of our sys-
tem of justice" and harms entire community).
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